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BOOK REVIEW
ZONING FOR MINIMUM LOT AREA. By T. Rogers, W. Rabin, D. B. Gibbons, J.
Stephenson I. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Villanova Press, 1959.. When
Easttown Township, Pennsylvania, enacted a zoning ordinance in 1940, the township
legislators could scarcely have predicted that their particular zoning ordinance would
attract national interest, and would even be the subject of a book.
A "Town Hall Meeting" was held last year at Villanova University following the
now famous case of Bilbar Construction Company vs. Board of Adjustment of Easttown
Township,1 which meeting was attended by two hundred attorneys, including counsel
involved in the case. At the meeting, according to William B. Ball, 2 who conducted the
meeting and later wrote the introduction for the book herein reviewed, "We did not
seek to retry the case, but we think much good could be served by better informing the
public of its facts and its implications." As an outgrowth of the meeting, the book was
written, the authors being four of the attorneys who attended the meeting. The book is
devoted exclusively to comments about the Bilbar case and its implications, legal,
economic and social. It would be difficult to discuss the book unless the reader had
some knowledge of the basic facts of the case, so I will set these out briefly.
The section in the zoning ordinance which was attacked in the Bilbar case was
one which provided that the minimum lot area in an "A" residential district should be
one acre, with a minimum frontage of 150 feet. The Bilbar Construction Company
and another concern acquired some real estate subject to the "A" residential minimum
lot requirements, and they made application to the township for a permit to construct
a dwelling on a lot of 21,000 square feet with 100 feet frontage. When permission to
build was denied, the matter was litigated and reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On May 2, 1958, this court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. The court
pointed out that, "While the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare is the test for checking subjectively whether a municipality's exertion
of its general power to zone has been exceeded, courts do not apply the criteria in a
vacuum." The court went on to say that although recent cases in Pennsylvania had
tended to ignore "general welfare" as a consideration in determining whether the police
power had been constitutionally exercised, "Its importance lies partly in the fact that it
admits of aesthetic consideration when passing upon the validity of a zoning ordinance."
The book is divided into four sections, each section constituting a comment covering
one particular aspect of the Bilbar case. The first section, entitled The Bilbar Case and
the Protectionof the Municipality, is authored by Theodore 0. Rogers, 3 who is solicitor
for the township which enacted the zoning ordinance in controversy. Quite naturally,
Mr. Rogers approves the decision which upheld the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance of the township he represents. He points out that zoning ordinances are
normally considered valid where they have a substantial relationship to health, safety,
morals or the general welfare. Accordingly, he states that the court would almost
necessarily have to take one of two positions: (1) That the regulation in question must
be clearly to preserve health, safety, morals or the general welfare; or (2) That the
regulation need only have a substantial or reasonable relation to health, safety, morals
or the general welfare. If the court took position (1), he states, "Then the burden would
appear to be on the municipality to justify its regulation .... " If the court adopted the
second position, then "It would seem to follow that the burden of proving the absence
of such relationship (to health, safety, morals or general welfare) should be on the one

1 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
2 Professor of Law, School of Law, Villanova University.
3

Of the Chester County, Pennsylvania Bar.
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asserting its invalidity." He went on to state that in 1957 when the Bilbar case came
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that his analysis of prior decisions led him to
believe that the decision would be the stricter view, as set out in proposition (1). It is
quite apparent that he was overjoyed when the court faced the issue squarely and
ruled in favor of the municipality. Discussing the court's ruling, he states that the
court "squarely decided that the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the ordinance rests upon the party so asserting, and that the presumption of constitutionality of
an ordinance is as strong as that attending an act of legislature." He goes on to state
that the "ghost" of the "clearly necessary" test has been banished from Pennsylvania.
On top of the layer of bouquets and plaudits heaped upon the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court by the author of the first comment on the Bilbar case, the author of
the second comment adds a layer of rather bitter criticism and scorn. In this respect it
is noted that the fact that the authors of the first two comments made no attempt to
write impartially, or indeed even objectively, makes their comments more readable and
interesting. Both authors set out their comments in clear, lawyerlike fashion, with the
obvious purpose of convincing the reader on the one hand that the decision was one
of the most learned and logical which was ever handed down by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, and on the other hand, that the decision was probably the Court's
worst.
4
The author of the second comment, Walter W. Rabin, who entitles his comment,
of the Bilbar case, ".... the
as
a
result
that
states
The Bilbar Case and Home Building,
law of zoning with regard to constitutionality has been left in a state of confusion and
uncertainty." He goes on to state that the court ". . . without reversing anything, has
reversed everything. In just a few pages of the decision, the court without indicating
that it was overruling any of its prior decisions, made certain statements which were so
completely contrary to the well settled law as it had then existed, that it is impossible
for them to exist side by side. And yet, in the absence of a pronouncement that any
prior law has been repudiated, that is precisely the situation."
He bitterly attacks the court in its acknowledgment that aesthetic consideration can
be utilized in passing upon the validity of the zoning ordinance, when he states, "And
what is the boundary, if any, beyond which aesthetics may not be a determining factor?
To be more specific, could a municipality lawfully ordain that in keeping with the
general character and architecture of that municipality, no residence could be built which
was not colonial or modern, or any other style of architecture which appealed to the
aesthetic sense of the commissioners or supervisors of that municipality?" In defense
of the builders, he states that "With the expanded powers granted municipalities under
the Bilbar case, the builder now has little choice other than to submit to whatever
regulations are imposed, no matter how unreasonable, or else abandon his building
operations."
D. Barry Gibbons 5 is the author of the third comment, which is entitled Minimum
Lot Requirements-The National Picture. The comment is a scholarly analysis of the
state of the law in the United States with regard to minimum lot requirements. He states
that although zoning regulations are widespread in the United States, minimum lot requirements have not become a matter of judicial concern in 9 states, namely, Montana,
New Mexico, Vermont, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, Idaho and Indiana.
Of the remaining 39 states, he points out that Georgia, Oklahoma, South Dakota and
Wyoming 6 express an extremely conservative view with regard to land regulation and
use, "generally holding such restrictive regulation to be in derogation of the common

Of the Philadelphia Bar. Co-author of Law of Zoning in Pennsylvania.
5 Of the Delaware County Bar.
4

6 Richardson v. Passmore, 207 Ga. 572, 63 S.E. 2d 392 (1951); City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long,
206 Okla. 307, 243 P. 2d 697 (1952). But see Modern Builders, Inc. v. Building Inspector of City of
Tulsa, 197 Okla. 80, 168 P.2d 883 (1946), an ordinance containing minimum area requirement
attacked but not on that ground. City of Sioux Falls v. Mary Cleveland, 75 S. Dak. 548, 70 N.W.
2d 62 (1955); State ex rel. George v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948).
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law and, as such, to be construed in favor of the property owners, and generally expressing a disfavor toward any restrictions on real property." He points out that of the
35 jurisdictions remaining, the specific problem of the constitutionality of minimum lot
requirements have been presented to the courts of 12 states, and 11 out of the 12 have
upheld the validity of such ordinances. It thus appears that the Bilbar case brings
Pennsylvania into the area of the majority rule. The author then analyzes the decisions
in these 12 states. The 11 states which have upheld the validity of zoning ordinances
7
containing minimum lot requirements (in addition to Pennsylvania) are California,
8
9
0
12
3
14
Connecticut, Florida, Maryland,' Massachusetts," Illinois, Missouri,1 Nebraska,
New Jersey, 15 New York 16 and Texas. 17 Alone in its holding that such zoning laws are
unconstitutional is the state of Michigan, where, the author states, "Virtually all attacks
on zoning regulations are sustained.... ." He points out that Michigan has ruled that the
reasonableness of the exercise of police power is always subject to judicial review.
The author of the fourth comment, John G. Stephenson III,18 discusses the sociological effects of the Bilbar decision, entitling his comment Zoning, Planning and
Democratic Values. It is quite apparent that the author disapproves of the decision of
the Bilbar case, but unlike the author of the second comment, he does not say so in so
many words. He advocates that owners of suburban property should protect themselves by private means, such as cooperative purchase of undeveloped areas, restrictive
covenants, and similar devices. He seems to suggest that perhaps zoning should return to
its original confines of excluding nuisances from established areas, and states, "We can
allow private persons to express their desire for controlled neighborhoods through cooperative ownership, large scale developments for the purpose of lease, and restrictive
covenants; but we cannot tolerate this expression through zoning."
He does not consider that it is desirable, by means of zoning ordinances, to stabilize
a community and protect property values, stating, "It must be remembered that the
settlement of the New World was accomplished by people who fled a society in which
an overly stable property system had become the means of dividing society into rigid
classes. In the interest of greater stability the laws of primogeniture and borough English
denied the inheritance of land to all but the oldest and youngest sons." In expressing a
fear that minimum lot zoning might stratify our society, the author apparently failed
to take into consideration the fact that in the United States anyone can aspire to ownership of a 1-acre lot. In addition, he has perhaps not considered the effect of our present
tax laws, state and federal, upon large estates, which tax laws tend to prevent large
estates from remaining in the hands of one family for several generations; nor the
effect of our laws of eminent domain which enable governmental bodies, public utilities,
and others to condemn land in the public interest.
The author further states that, "It has been noted 19 that while the American people
have advanced politically to the stature of a nation, that they have not advanced
culturally beyond the condition of a tribal society. While we identify ourselves as
American citizens, and incidentally as citizens of the state in which we reside, we identify
ourselves at the same time as rich or poor, professional people or business people, ac-
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Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 216 P.2d 1 (1950).
De Mars v. Zoning Commission, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955).
Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 642 (1941).
County Commissioners v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946).
Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E. 2d 516 (1942).
Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E. 2d 270 (1956).
Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 382 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W. 2d 771 (1952).
Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W. 2d 634 (1944).
Fisher v. Bedminister Township, 11 N.J. 144 (1952).
Wolfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
Professor of Law, School of Law, Villanova University.
The author does not state by whom it "has been noted."
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cording to the national origin of our ancestors, or according to our religious affiliations
or lack of them. In terms of the zoning and home building problem, we prefer to live
with other people of the same economic, ethnic and cultural class."
In my opinion, the author exaggerates the danger inherent in zoning ordinances
which give some consideration to aesthetic matters. Nothing in the cases discussed in
this book would lead one to conclude that any court in any state would uphold zoning
ordinances which presume to zone real estate in accordance with the religion, national
origin, profession or occupation of the owners of such real estate. However, there undoubtedly are dangers inherent in placing too much stress upon aesthetic standards, and
perhaps no better way could be found to emphasize this real danger than to exaggerate
it. Furthermore, the author's suggestion that private enterprise should assume a greater
,share of the burden of planning subdivisions and protecting home owners has considerable merit.
Although, as the reader may discern, I disagree to some extent with the views of
the author of the fourth comment, his section is extremely well written, and perhaps
because it does present views with which I disagree, it is probably the most stimulating
and thought provoking of the four comments.
It is impossible to engage in the general practice of law in any community in this
country without encountering numerous problems involving zoning. Therefore, the book
is recommended reading for lawyers who must, of necessity, become better informed
about a field which enters into practically every real estate transaction today.
John M. Anderton*

* LLB, University of Notre Dame, 1949; Member of Indiana Bar; Former Trial Attorney,
U.S. Department of Justice, Anti-Trust Division; Former City Attorney for La Porte, Indiana;
Presently practicing in La Porte, Indiana.

